The Securitization Dilemma in Global Climate Security Governance and the Chinese Solution

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Abstract: The issue of climate security is not only crucial for the survival and well-being of individuals, ensuring their right to life and health, but also forms an essential aspect of a nation's security and the protection of its rights and interests in development. It is related to various fields including global politics, economy, military, ecology, and culture, impacting both global security and national security. From the 19th century to the 1970s, the issue of climate change was largely non-politicized, and global climate security governance faced many practical challenges and dilemmas. Over the past thirty years, China has participated in global climate governance from different perspectives and has a rich theoretical foundation for seeking solutions to global climate security governance issues. For China to deeply engage in global climate security governance, it must confront these challenges head-on, furthering international cooperation in the field of adaptation through institutional design, leading mechanisms, and agenda setting.

1. The Historical Evolution and Practice of Global Climate Securitization

A series of significant climate events occurred in 2007, prompting the United Nations Security Council to initiate a series of debates on the relationship between security and climate change. The impact of climate change on global security and development has increasingly gained attention and importance. However, the discussion on climate security did not begin in 2007. As early as the 1980s, the relationship between the environment and conflict attracted widespread attention in the academic community. The transition from "climate change" to "climate security" involved a series of cognitive shifts before reaching the current state of securitization in global climate issues.

1.1. The Origin of Climate Securitization Discourse

The discourse on climate and security can be traced back to the 1980s, where the relationship between the environment and conflict garnered broad academic interest. In these extensive discussions, people began to consider whether environmental issues truly affected a country's stability and altered its security.

Since the mid-1980s, the relationship between the environment and conflict initially piqued academic interest. Those skeptical of the environment-conflict perspective raised objections to the link between environment and conflict. They argued that violent conflicts stem solely from political and military factors, and it is these factors, not environmental changes, that cause conflicts. Some scholars noted that extensive literature and case studies often link conflicts with resource competition and scarcity, suggesting that issues like soil degradation, deforestation, and freshwater scarcity do not directly lead to conflicts[1]. Although the connection between the environment and conflict remains a debated issue, there is also substantial support for the environment-conflict perspective. The Brundtland Report explicitly stated that environmental stress is caused by political and military conflicts[2]. Subsequently, the relationship between the environment and conflict gained increasing recognition in academia, with many studies demonstrating that climate and environmental factors directly lead to political instability and violent conflicts[3].

1.2. The Emergence and Development of Climate Securitization Discourse

Climate securitization has undergone several stages to reach its current comprehensive state. In the initial stage, the discourse on climate security always emerged alongside environmental security. With the clarification of the concept of climate securitization, the United Nations Security Council included climate change in its security discussions, and many countries and international organizations actively supported incorporating climate change into the international security agenda following the securitization of climate change as an existential threat. Currently, the international community has a more comprehensive and profound understanding of the security threat posed by climate change.

1.2.1. From "Climate Change" to "Climate Security"

The emergence of climate security discourse is based on the attention given to climate issues, which were not always a focus of the scientific and international political communities. In the 1980s, many scientists still questioned the mechanisms of global warming and the greenhouse effect.

Until the early 1990s, renowned meteorologist Professor Richard S. Lindzen was still questioning global warming from an empirical perspective and refuting the concept of the "greenhouse effect" theoretically, citing significant uncertainties in the greenhouse effect mechanism[4].

By the early 21st century, the narrative linking climate change, conflict, and security became more prevalent. In 2002, Germany submitted a report titled "Abrupt Climate Change and Its Impacts on U.S. National Security," commissioned by its Environmental Ministry. The report highlighted that climate change was challenging U.S. security, marking the first government-commissioned study on climate security. Economist Sir Nicholas Stern published a report on the economics of climate change, predicting the emergence of 200 million environmental refugees by 2015 due to conflicts triggered by climate change[5]. The discourse on climate change securitization resonated not only in developed countries but also at the international level[6]. In 2003, the World Health Organization published a report on the global health impacts of climate change, noting that it had already caused excessive human deaths. In 2006, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon referred to climate change as the greatest security threat facing the world, comparing its destructive potential to that of World War II. Since then, the relationship between climate change and security has become clearer, and the system of climate security discourse has gradually taken shape[7].

1.2.2. The Cognitive Shift in Climate Securitization

The true formation of climate security discourse can be traced back to 2007, a pivotal year for climate security. That year, the UK first brought the issue of climate change and security to the Security Council, which held its first public debate on the relationship between climate, energy, and security. This marked the first time the United Nations focused on climate change and security issues, officially incorporating climate change into the global security agenda. Other specialized UN agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme and the International Organization for Migration, also began discussing climate securitization, focusing on specific issues like migration and conflict[8]. As new challenges such as energy security, environmental security, refugee crises, and resource scarcity emerged, various regional organizations integrated climate discourse into their security agendas. In 2010, NATO included a chapter on environment and security in its latest security principles.

Following the UN Security Council's inclusion of climate change in security discussions and its emphasis on climate change as an existential threat, not only did a series of UN agencies and regional organizations actively support the inclusion of climate change in the international security agenda, but many countries also began to focus on this issue, incorporating climate security discourse into their national security strategies. Developed countries like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as many small island developing states, explicitly expressed their acceptance and support for the EU's concept of climate security. It is noteworthy that during the 5663rd meeting of the Security Council in 2007, representatives from 56 different countries and regions spoke, with 41 representatives (73.2% of the speakers) explicitly stating that they consider climate change a security issue[9].

1.2.3. The Deepening of Climate Securitization Awareness

Before the UN Secretary-General released the report "Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications" in 2009, members of the international community had some awareness of the security implications of climate change, but it was neither systematic nor comprehensive. This report, which sought opinions from both developed and developing countries, reflected the progress in the international community's understanding of the security threats posed by climate change since the start of the securitization process. Thus, the international community's awareness of the security implications of climate change became more comprehensive and systematic.

2. The Securitization Dilemma in Global Climate Security Governance

Global climate security governance faces numerous practical difficulties and dilemmas. Western powers, led by the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, are the main driving forces behind global climate security governance. However, in their active promotion of climate securitization, there tends to be an inclination towards "over-securitization," portraying climate change as a hard security issue with military implications. Countries like Russia and India are prone to "under-securitization," which can deepen security crises or trigger new kinds of social security crises. Small island nations, African countries, and some of the least developed countries, due to their marginalized status in international politics, often find their interests overlooked and unaddressed, leading to a "silent securitization" dilemma.

2.1. The "Over-Securitization" Dilemma in Global Climate Security Governance

"Over-securitization" refers to a public issue being prematurely defined and elevated as a security issue before it is sufficient to become a security topic, causing resource wastage, public panic, and policy practice confusion. Securitization is the transformation of a public issue into a security issue through a specific political or social process[10]. Thus, when an issue is recognized as an object of securitization, it forms a new security problem. Due to the subjective construction of the "speech acts" implementers in the securitization process, they might fabricate security threats or exaggerate crises for specific political purposes, leading to the securitization of topics that should not be securitized. This excessive choice can lead to over-securitization and result in the abuse of state power and improper allocation of social resources. For example, attributing the causes of natural disasters or emergencies to climate change without sufficient evidence and elevating it to a climate security issue is a direct manifestation of over-securitization[11]. Western powers, led by the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, are the main drivers of the over-securitization of climate change issues.

2.1.1. The EU's Approach and Process of Climate Securitization

The EU and its member states have long been advocates of taking action on climate change and security both domestically and internationally, and the European Commission was one of the first institutions to identify climate change as a security issue. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, European countries like the UK, Germany, and France felt a reduced urgency and importance in addressing military threats. New challenges such as energy security, environmental security, refugees, and resource scarcity brought by EU expansion urgently needed to be included in the EU's security agenda.

2.1.2. The U.S. Approach and Process of Climate Securitization

Compared to the UK, the U.S. started its process of climate change securitization later and has always been inconsistent. In 2007, U.S. representative Alejandro Wolff stated at the Security Council that climate change obviously posed serious challenges, and energy security, climate change, and sustainable development are fundamentally interconnected. Since then, the U.S. began to focus on the link between climate change and national security, shifting its perspective on climate change from development to security, gradually securitizing it[9]. That same year, the U.S. Naval Analysis Center released a report on "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change." In this context, climate

security was officially incorporated into U.S. national security and has since continued to rise in importance in U.S. national security strategy[12].

2.1.3. Assessment of the "Over-Securitization" Dilemma

Developed countries led by the EU, UK, and U.S. have taken the lead in climate security governance, being at the forefront of the world in terms of climate security awareness, risk assessment, and comprehensive response. They firmly believe that climate security risks cross national borders and affect multiple fields like economy, politics, military, and environment, exacerbating regional armed conflicts and destabilizing fragile states and international security. International organizations like the G7 and EU place high importance on the global climate security agenda, promoting the transformation of climate security policies into practical actions. Moreover, they believe that resolving the contradictions between climate and security requires a broader concept of security. The international community should pay more attention to the security impact of climate change, and not just analyze climate security issues from a perspective based on national sovereignty. A broader security concept is needed to address the issues between climate and security.

2.2. The "Under-Securitization" Dilemma in Global Climate Security Governance

The "under-securitization" dilemma refers to a public issue that should be elevated to a security topic but remains within the realm of public issues due to a lack of necessary recognition and judgment, preventing it from receiving the requisite human, material, and financial resources. A lack of choice or action by actors in the securitization process leads to "under-securitization," where security actors treat security issues as public issues, to some extent underestimating or even neglecting them. This can occur either due to incapacity to address security agendas or inability to act effectively, leading to unresolved and timely security issues. "Under-securitization" can deepen security crises or trigger new types of social security crises.

2.2.1. The Approach and Process of Climate Securitization in Russia and India

Russia's climate policy actions have always been relatively slow. In 2020, the Russian government published its first national action plan for the first phase of adapting to climate change. In this plan, the federal government committed to the safety of citizens affected by the consequences of climate change. On December 13, 2021, Russia used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block a thematic resolution on climate change and security proposed by Ireland and Niger. The resolution, drafted by Niger and Ireland, called for the Security Council to address "information concerning the impact of climate change on security." Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution draft, negotiated over several months, that would have defined climate change as a threat to peace for the first time, a stance also supported by India. Russia's UN Ambassador Vasily A. Nebenzya stated that it viewed the resolution as an excuse by wealthy Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, arguing that framing climate change as a threat to international security would divert the Council's attention from the real and deep-rooted causes of national conflicts[13].

2.2.2. Assessment of the "Under-Securitization" Dilemma

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the priority of climate change issues in Russian government affairs has been low, as the country's economic development heavily relies on the fossil energy sector. The impact of climate change on Russia's energy and food sectors is limited, posing a threat only to ecological security and not yet involving military security. In fact, heavyweight UN members Russia and India have consistently opposed discussing this issue at the international level in the Security Council[14]. Although Russia does not question the severity of climate change, it believes the Security Council lacks the specialized knowledge and tools to develop effective solutions to address climate change realistically. Climate change should not be seen as a universal challenge within the scope of international security but should be dealt with according to each specific situation. India believes it is uncertain whether quickly resolving the securitization of climate change to address climate-related disasters can achieve climate security, as considerations of international peace and security often prevail over others[15].

Therefore, defining an issue as a security challenge typically increases attention and resources to address it specifically. While securitizing climate change might help raise public awareness, there are significant drawbacks to securitization. When cooperation is clearly the most effective way to address this threat, the securitization approach can push countries into competition. Thinking from a security perspective often leads to overly militarized solutions to problems that essentially require non-military strategies. In short, this leads to the wrong actors being involved[16].

2.3. The "Silent Securitization" Dilemma in Global Climate Security Governance

Some countries supporting the securitization of climate change emphasize their vulnerability due to climate change, demanding forceful international and domestic responses to climate security issues. For example, Pacific small island states, due to their unique geographical locations, have always been highly concerned about climate securitization. These small island nations, African countries, and some of the least developed countries emphasize the hazards of climate change. Because of their marginalized status in international politics, their interests and demands have long been overlooked and not given due attention in policy, meaning they do not receive the policy or external support they should in the securitization process. Hence, they easily fall into the "silent securitization" dilemma, a specific kind of "present but unnoticed securitization dilemma"[17].

2.3.1. The Approach and Process of Climate Securitization in Small Island Developing States

Small island developing states are on the front lines of climate change. Geographically remote and low-lying, they are vulnerable to environmental challenges and, being small in size and population and spread across the globe, are among those most affected by climate change, yet they contribute less than 1% to global carbon emissions. Climate change has made these nations some of the world's most vulnerable, with their unique geography continually threatening the livelihood security of their citizens. In 1992, the international community first identified small island developing states as a unique group facing distinct social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. Subsequently, these states successfully lobbied for the adoption of Agenda 21[18]. At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference, they set securing adequate, accessible, and sustainable climate change adaptation fund support as a key goal of their climate diplomacy (this conference, held in 1994, specified actions to help small island developing states achieve sustainable development. Agenda 21 in Chapter 17 mentioned their small size, limited resources, geographical dispersion, and susceptibility to ecological fragility and vulnerability, calling for enhanced international cooperation and the first global conference on sustainable development of small island developing states). The UN Human Rights Council, through its resolutions on human rights and climate change, authorizes important activities and reports that analyze the relationship between climate change and human rights, clarifying how to ensure the rights of vulnerable groups in the context of climate action[19]. In fact, since 2014, the Human Rights Council has adopted a resolution on human rights and climate change each year (each year, the resolution focuses on a specific theme, including the links between human rights, climate change, migration, and cross-border displacement; the adverse impacts of climate change on children's rights; and the impacts of climate change on people with disabilities; the impact of climate change on international security, etc.)[20].

2.3.2. Assessment of the "Silent Securitization" Dilemma

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in climate negotiations demands that countries worldwide pay attention to their right to exist. Global sea-level rise severely threatens these countries' existence, making the alliance extremely sensitive to global greenhouse gas emissions. While climate change might be a development issue for other parts of the world, it is an existential issue for AOSIS, with global greenhouse gas emissions being a matter of life and death. Hence, they have set high targets for limiting global greenhouse gas emissions. Small island states, African countries, and some of the least developed countries place great importance on and pay close attention to climate security issues, with active climate security risk responses being incorporated into the policy frameworks of major regional organizations[21]. However, these countries have long been marginalized in international political activities. Coupled with the generally low level of economic development of

small island nations and lack of funds to tackle climate change, their interests and demands have long been overlooked and not given due attention in the international climate change arena, leaving small island developing states in an absolutely weak position in terms of overall strength.

3. Analysis of the Dilemmas in the Securitization of Global Climate Governance

The emergence of the "over-securitization," "under-securitization," and "silent securitization" dilemmas is primarily due to several reasons. On one hand, in the context of anti-globalization, the complexity of climate security issue governance demands higher standards for global climate security governance, yet the global climate security governance system lacks the requisite leadership, posing the most realistic challenge. On the other hand, major powers, in order to maintain their international and domestic interests, approach global climate security governance from different perspectives and interests, leading to varied responses to climate change.

3.1. A. Real Challenges in the Securitization of Global Climate Governance

The "upgrade" of security issues in "over-securitization" and the "downgrade" in "under-securitization" are both manifestations of inappropriate "choices" in security politics. With the deepening of global connections and growing uncertainty, people's confidence in globalization is wavering. Under these circumstances, the global climate security governance system requires stronger leadership, which is the most realistic challenge it faces.

3.1.1. The Rise of Anti-globalization Sentiment and Its Negative Effects

The current international situation is complex and rapidly changing. The sudden pandemic has plunged the world into a period of frequent major events. Since the 21st century, people have witnessed events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the global financial crisis, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, ongoing unrest in West Asia and North Africa, and the refugee crisis plaguing Europe. From Asia to Africa, from the Middle East to Europe, hotspot issues have emerged one after another, with continuous national turmoil. Traditional and non-traditional security threats are intertwined, forcing close attention and in-depth thinking on non-traditional threats. The international situation is undergoing its most profound political evolution since the Cold War.

While a simple analysis of these events may suggest they haven't directly and profoundly impacted global climate security governance, they have indeed triggered a series of chain reactions. Global climate security governance largely determines the future international division of labor and will influence the entire international order's changes, as it will drive the world toward a low-carbon economy transition. However, many countries have their own "calculations" regarding climate issues.

3.1.2. Lack of Leadership in Global Climate Security Governance

Undoubtedly, global issues inevitably require global cooperation. No country can combat climate change alone, and unilateral actions of a single nation cannot completely solve the issue. The basis for global cooperation is multilateralism, which is also the fundamental concept of international collaboration. Global climate security governance requires international cooperation, but under the current trend of anti-globalization, the complexity and urgency of climate security issues pose higher demands on global climate security governance. It needs leadership to gather consensus, safeguard interests, and ultimately achieve common values among nations. This calls for seeking the most suitable leaders in terms of value concepts, normative guidance, and mechanism construction[22].

Looking globally, considering the United States' attitude towards the Paris Agreement, which has a direct impact on multilateralism, it is difficult to see it as capable of leading global climate security governance. The European Union and surrounding European countries, long-time practitioners and maintainers of multilateralism, have recently been mired in multiple crises, including debt, economic, refugee, COVID-19, and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, issues like Brexit have severely damaged integration, leaving the EU almost unable to focus on multilateralism, which will seriously delay the governance process of global climate change and weaken the international community's ability and determination to address issues promptly[23]. Additionally, many countries actively involved in the

securitization process (such as small island states, African countries, etc.) are marginalized in international political activities, let alone leading global climate security governance[24].

3.2. "Ideological Conflict" and "International Power Play" in the Securitization of Global Climate Governance

3.2.1. Different Positions and Motivations of Countries Towards Global Climate Securitization

Countries have always held different views and attitudes towards the securitization of climate issues in global climate security governance, with some expressing support and others strong opposition. Even among countries that appear very active, their motivations for decisions may differ, often more related to political gains. With the initiation and deepening of the securitization process of climate change, the impact of international climate negotiations and cooperation on the rights and obligations of countries worldwide is constantly increasing. Major powers, in order to protect their international and domestic interests, maintain varying views and attitudes towards the securitization of climate issues.

Even among countries actively participating in global climate security governance, their motivations for decisions may vary and are often more related to the political benefits of climate change. As India pointed out, participants in securitization often aim to draw attention by highlighting climate threats, especially for non-permanent members of the Security Council. For those aspiring for a non-permanent seat, climate change has become an excellent campaign topic. In such cases, political interests stem not from the proclaimed climate threat but from the growing importance of climate change in international relations[25-26].

3.2.2. International Power Play in the Securitization of Global Climate Governance

Climate issues relate to the rights and obligations of countries worldwide, reflecting their competition for power and interests, particularly in the process of global climate security governance. Behind it all is still the struggle among countries for climate discourse power, economic dominance, and ethical value orientations.

In the field of international climate governance, the struggle for discourse power in global climate governance is also a competition for soft and hard power in the international arena. If a country can control the international climate discourse, it can potentially steer the process or outcome of international climate governance in a direction favorable to its interests. A country's discourse power in various fields can promote the maximization of its own interests to some extent. Therefore, the EU, in order to achieve its security strategic objectives, places great importance on and strives to enhance its authoritative voice in the securitization process of climate change. If a country can have a strong voice in global climate security governance, it hopes to steer the direction of global climate security governance in a way that is beneficial to itself.

4. China's Path in Global Climate Security Governance

4.1. China's Strategy in Global Climate Security Governance

In the process of securitization of various non-traditional issues in today's world, major power diplomacy faces many challenges. China's attempt to lead global climate security governance and establish discourse authority in the securitization process requires an analysis and design of discourse systems from the perspective of maintaining global interests. Besides, China must maintain close contact with both developing and developed countries to achieve cooperative wins. Finally, China aims to enhance its influence in shaping international norms and build a cooperative and win-win international climate security normative system.

4.1.1. Seeking the Intersection of National Security with Others and Enhancing Climate Security Discourse Authority

The key to a successful securitization process is that the security discourse of the securitizing actor gains acceptance and recognition from its audience. In the international power play of non-traditional

security, participants include not only states and blocs but also international organizations, NGOs, corporations, and individuals. To engage these participants in the proposed topics, the topics need to be closely related to global interests. Moreover, to gain widespread acceptance and recognition of concepts and viewpoints in the securitizing actor's discourse, global interests must be integrated into the entire discourse system.

4.1.2. Maintaining Close Contact with Developing and Developed Countries for Cooperative Wins

In promoting the Paris Agreement, China actively participated in negotiations on various issues and conducted intensive shuttle diplomacy, encouraging cooperation among all parties. On one hand, China strengthened consultations with the BASIC countries, like-minded developing country groups, and "Group of 77 + China," maintaining the unity and common interests of developing countries and playing a constructive leading role among them. On the other hand, China kept close communication with developed countries and blocs like the United States and the European Union, actively expanding consensus and finding practical middle grounds. The proposals put forward by China during the Paris Climate Conference considered the positions and demands of all parties, seeking the "greatest common divisor" of interests among them, and promoted win-win solutions in multilateral climate negotiations. After the Paris Climate Conference, then U.S. President Obama and French President Hollande separately called the Chinese President, thanking China for its role in the success of the conference.

4.1.3. Enhancing the Influence on International Norms and Building a Cooperative Win-win International Climate Normative System

International climate norms encompass many aspects, including carbon reduction, adaptation mechanisms, funding mechanisms, and technology mechanisms, which are closely related to energy production and use, public infrastructure construction, and technology R&D in countries around the world. These norms impact the national economy and people's livelihoods, so the future international climate norm-making process will inevitably involve intense interest bargaining. To help developing countries ensure their legitimate interests are reflected in international norms, China should strive to enhance its influence in shaping international climate norms. When China works to influence international climate norms, it needs to pay attention not only to substantive norms but also to procedural norms. Although procedural norms may not seem to directly involve the interests of international community members compared to substantive norms, in reality, without procedural fairness, it's difficult to ensure that substantive norms fairly reflect the reasonable demands of the international community members.

4.2. Legal Framework Construction in Global Climate Security Governance

4.2.1. Continued Debates and Discussions on Climate Security by the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council should continue to hold high-level public debates and discussions on climate security with UN member states, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations to utilize the role of international institutions. This approach leverages the knowledge of the Security Council, providing a ready forum for interaction with leading climate scientists, and offers the opportunity to develop legal and policy solutions to address the most pressing climate security threats. Such efforts can intensify the focus on climate change and its security implications on the international stage, potentially unlocking the door for the Council to take a series of robust and legally binding follow-up actions. Article 41 economic measures of the Security Council could be a powerful tool, using targeted sanctions to penalize particularly destructive climate actions, thereby addressing climate change.

4.2.2. Development of Proactive Climate Security Risk Assessment Tools by the United Nations

The Security Council should build on earlier efforts and address the adverse impacts of climate

change through Security Council resolutions, adopting a more proactive, risk-based approach to climate. This requires the Council to enhance understanding of climate risks within the UN system, improve capacities in comprehensive identification, analysis, forecasting, early warning, and conflict prevention of climate security risks. It also involves strengthening communication and coordination with relevant agencies such as the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNEP, and FAO, exploring effective mechanisms for the synergistic response to prevent climate risks, and establishing a well-defined, coordinated, and efficient climate security response system. The Security Council can take various forms to devise proactive risk assessment measures and coordinate specific climate security affairs among relevant UN agencies.

4.2.3. Utilization of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as the Main Channel

We should treat the UNFCCC as a platform for extensive global participation in climate governance, adhere to principles and standards of democracy and science, participate widely, engage in equal consultation and dialogue, share benefits and risks, and fulfill responsibilities. To build this platform effectively, the UN should leverage its strengths and functionalities. In the face of emerging climate, environmental, and public health issues, the UN can draft agendas and negotiation schedules, mobilize countries and regions to participate in discussions on global common environmental security issues, form drafts, conduct signings oriented towards national societies, and monitor the fulfillment of duties. This platform should effectively unite people from all countries to jointly resist risks and effectively reduce climate security threats.

5. Conclusion

The issue of climate change has evolved from a topic of scientific interest to one of the core issues in international politics, undergoing a gradual development from "non-politicization" to "politicization," and then to "securitization." With the initiation and deepening of the securitization process of climate change, global climate security governance faces a series of dilemmas. Humanity lives in the present but is closely linked to the past and future. The history of humankind has continuously accumulated and laid the foundation for the present, while the future safety of humankind is an indispensable "prospective orientation" in human development. As a value and practical orientation of "prospective security," the solution to global climate security governance is complex in the real world. Though it carries a certain idealistic color, as long as sovereign states move forward together towards the direction of a "community with a shared future for mankind" and take concrete actions to create an environment where humans and nature coexist harmoniously, the "ought-to-be" ideal of China leading global climate security governance can become an "actual" state.

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